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Abstract
The Operational Risk Advanced Measurement Approach requires financial institutions to
use scenarios to model these risks and to evaluate the pertaining capital charges. Considering
that a banking group is composed of numerous entities (branches and subsidiaries), and that
each one of them is represented by an Operational Risk Manager (ORM), we propose a novel
scenario approach based on ORM expertise to collect information and create new data sets
focusing on large losses, and the use of the Extreme Value Theory (EVT) to evaluate the
corresponding capital allocation. In this paper, we highlight the importance to consider an
a priori knowledge of the experts associated to a a posteriori backtesting based on collected
incidents.
Keywords: Operational risks - EVT - AMA - Expert - Value-at-Risk - Expected Shortfall
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1 Introduction
The Advanced Measurement Approach (BCBS (2001; 2009)) requires banks to carry out scenario
analysis to compute the capital allocation pertaining to operational risks (Cruz (2004), Cher-
nobai et al. (2007) and Shevchenko (2011)). Scenarios may have multiple forms depending on
the kind of risk modeled. For example, exogenous extremal risks such as a flood, an earthquake
or a pandemic may be modeled using Bayesian networks, or disasters and ruin theory, etc. For
some other scenarios modeling endogenous risks, for example, frauds, execution failures etc., one
may use expert opinions. Indeed, such experts exist in banks and insurance companies and have
a very good knowledge of the incidents that may occur in their specific work segment.
We have multiple motivations to use expert opinions. First, considering local operational risk
managers as experts, they are the tip of sword and the guardian of the system efficiency, and
they represent an important link with the permanent control system. Some of them collect the
loss incidents, others have in charge deploying some plans to prevent operational risks, therefore
they have a real experience of the operational risks and are able to anticipate them accurately.
Their opinions incorporate different types of information such as what behaviors are important,
permanent, cyclic...; how strong is the activity in a particular entity in a particular period; how
efficient are the measures taken to prevent these risks, etc. We have a real opportunity to use
their expertise several times a year either to understand the evolution of the operational risks,
either to estimate a capital allocation or to evaluate prospective amounts.
For obvious reasons, working with historical data sets bias our vision of extremal events as their
frequency is much lower than for regular events (small and medium sized). Therefore large
losses are difficult to analyze and model. A solution stands in modeling extremal events in a
specific framework, for instance considering the Generalized Pareto distribution to model the
severities (Pickands (1975), Coles (2004) and Guégan et al. (2010)), nevertheless, this method
requires large enough data sets to ensure the robustness of the estimations. Using historical
data, if we cannot correctly fit these distributions whose information is contained in the tails, a
possibility is to use experts opinions to build new data sets that we will analyze. Indeed, the
analysis capacity of these experts and their anticipation analysis regarding operational risks large
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amounts incidents can be profitable to create reliable information sets to model operational risks.
The information obtained from the experts may be heterogeneous as they have not the same ex-
perience, the same information quality or the same location, thus in order to reduce the impact
of heterogeneous information sets, we are only going to ask them the maximum value a bank
could lose if a particular event type occurs on a particular business unit in a specific period (a
week, a month, etc.). Therefore, each expert is going to provide several maxima per cell of the
Basel matrix and also for different levels of granularity and for a defined horizon.
Our objective is to provide capital charges associated to the different cells of the Basel matrix1
built with these data sets, and as soon as we work with sequences of maxima, we will use the
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) (Leadbetter et al. (1983), Resnick (1987), Embrechts et al. (1997)
and de Haan and Ferreira (2010)) to compute them. This theoretical framework tells that under
regularity conditions, a series of maxima follows a Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribu-
tion given in (2.1). Using the maxima series, the GEV distributions’ parameters are estimated by
MLE2 (Hoel (1962)) and for each cell a capital charge is provided considering two risk measures:
the Value-at-Risk and the Expected Shortfall.
In a first section, we present our experimental process and in a second section, we provide and
analyze the results we obtained. The last section concludes.
2 A Strategy based on risk managers
2.1 Maxima series construction
We assume a banking group as illustrated in Figure 1, which has several branches and subsidiaries
all around a country or even all over the world. In each branch or subsidiary, the group has ex-
perts responsible for the operational risks on different business units such as those included in
the Basel matrix. Note that regarding the recent compulsory takeovers we eyewitnessed more
and more financial institutions present a similar shape.
1Tables 1 and 3 provide examples of the Basel Matrix
2Maximum Likelihood Estimation
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Banking Group
Brand A Network Brand B Network
Branch
(Partial Detention)
A Bank Z Bank A Bank Z Bank
Experts QuotationsExperts Quotations
Branch
Experts Quotations
Experts Quotations
Max1,…, Maxn
Max1,…, Maxn
Max1,…, Maxn Max1,…, Maxn
Figure 1: A typical financial group, with the headquarters on the top and its different subsidiaries.
Assuming that we have 푖 = 1, ..., 푝 subsidiaries or branches, each one is represented by a opera-
tional risk manager (ORM). This manager can provide 푗 = 1, ..., 푛 quotations per cell in a year
(for instance). Thus, for a given date, we can have 푛푝 quotations for a cell. Denoting 푞 the level
of granularity of the cell, if 푞 = 0 it means we work on the first level of granularity. If 푞 ∕= 03 then
we consider particular sub-event types, saying that we work on the second level of granularity.
We denote 푒 the event type and 푏 the business unit in the Basel Matrix. For each cell, focusing
on the maximum values, we denote푀푎푥(푗)푖;푒푏;푞 an expert value. For example, looking at Table 1 or
3, 푀푎푥(1)1;25;1 denotes the first quotation given by the ORM of the Caisse d’Epargne Ile-de-France
(a group entity) on the cell ("Payment and Settlement";"External Fraud/Theft and Fraud") and
푀푎푥
(3)
3;43;0 the third quotation given by the ORM of the Caisse d’Epargne Rhône Alpes on the
cell ("Commercial Banking";"Clients, Products & Business Practices").
3In our example, 푞 = 1, ..., 6
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Then, these 푛푝 quotations per cell provide a data set which corresponds to a sequence we refer as
a Maxima Data Set (MDS). In the following, we analyze such data sets obtained from branches
of BPCE to evaluate capital requirements corresponding to these large losses.
2.2 Methodology
Based on these MDS, we use the extreme value theory and mainly the Fisher-Tippet theorem
(Fisher and Tippett (1928), Gnedenko (1943), Appendix A.1) which states that under regular
conditions the distribution of a sequence of maxima converges asymptotically to a GEV distri-
bution 퐻휉 whose density is equal to,
ℎ(푥;푢, 훽, 휉) =
1
훽
[
1 + 휉
(
푥− 푢
훽
)]( 1
휉
)
−1
푒
−
[
1+휉
(
푥−푢
훽
)−1
휉
]
, (2.1)
for 1 + 휉 푥−푢훽 > 0, where 푢 ∈ ℛ is the location parameter, 훽 ∈ ℛ+∗ is the scale parameter and
휉 ∈ ℛ is the shape parameter. This distribution contains the Fréchet (휉 > 0), the Gumbel
(휉 = 0) and the Weibull (휉 < 0) distributions.
Remark 2.1. It is interesting to note that if 휉 > 1 in (2.1), then the distribution has no first
moment. This property is fundamental in the applications, because in this latter case we cannot
use the GEV distribution otherwise the capital charges would be infinite. Therefore, we have to
pay attention to the value of shape parameter (휉).
In order to obtain capital charges for the banks or the insurance companies pertaining to op-
erational risks, we directly use this distribution to compute the corresponding capital charges
through the two following risk measures:
Definition 2.1. Given a confidence level 훼 ∈ [0, 1], the Value-at-Risk (VaR) associated to a
random variable 푋 is given by the smallest number 푥 such that the probability that 푋 exceeds 푥
is not larger than (1− 훼)
푉 푎푅(1−훼)% = inf(푥 ∈ ℝ : 푃 (푋 > 푥) ≤ (1− 훼)), (2.2)
and,
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Definition 2.2. Let 휂 be the 푉 푎푅(1−훼)%, and 푋 a random variable which represents losses
during a prespecified period (such as a day, a week, or some other chosen time period) then, the
Expected Shortfall (ES) is equal to:
퐸푆(1−훼)% = 퐸(푋∣푋 > 휂) (2.3)
Using the previous definitions in our example, the random variable 푋 will follow the GEV
distribution adjusted on the MDS built with experts opinions. As soon as these information sets
are known for each cell and assuming that the data sets can be characterized by the distribution
(2.1), the parameters of this distribution will be estimated by MLE.
3 In the reality...
A company such as BPCE is a compound of numerous entities: 17 Caisse d’Epargne, 20 Banques
Populaires, Natixis plus all its own subsidiaries, the Credit Foncier de France etc. Thus this
group has almost 250 operational risk managers4. Therefore, we build the Basel Matrix made up
of 56 cases - 8 business lines ("b") × 7 event types ("e")5 in the first level of granularity, and 152
in the second level of granularity using the information provided by these experts. We observe
almost 200 quotations per cell every year, but this number can attain 3000.
In Tables 2 and 4 we provide the values of the estimated parameters, using the MDS, for each cell,
at the first level of granularity (푞 = 0) in Table 2, and at the second level of granularity (푞 ∕= 0)
in Table 4. We do not provide the standard deviations to keep the result readable. Nevertheless
all the standard deviations enable validating parameters estimations6. The parameter of interest
is 휉 because it characterizes the shape of the distribution. We observe that its value decreases
as the level of granularity increases. This remark is important because when 휉 > 1 at the first
level of granularity, its value can be less than 1 as soon as 푞 ∕= 0.This is fundamental to interpret
our results because in that latter case, it has a sense using the GEV to compute the capital
4To draw a parallel, the Société Générale has several thousands ORM.
5The business lines are corporate finance, trading & sales, retail banking, commercial banking, payment and
settlement, agency services, asset management and retail brokerage. The event types are internal fraud, external
fraud, employment practices & workplace safety, clients, products & business practices, damage to physical assets,
business disruption & system failures and execution, delivery & process management.
6These values may be provide on request
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requirement, as the mean of this distribution is no more infinite. In a recent paper, this fact
has already been highlighted in Guégan et al. (2010), Guégan and Hassani (2011) using a GPD.
Pointing at this point is important: indeed, mixing different nature of incidents in a same cell
(for example, the "system security" breaches and the "theft and fraud" in the "external fraud"
event type) may induce distortions in the estimation procedures.
In our example, we observe in the cell "Payment and Settlement"/"Internal Fraud" that the
estimated value for 휉 is 4.30 when 푞 = 0, thus this estimated GEV distribution cannot be kept.
Working on the second level of granularity, even if the 휉 value decreases, we cannot use this
estimated GEV distribution to compute capital charges. Thus, one may try to work on a third
level, nevertheless, in this case in our example the data were not available.
In the particular case of the "Retail Banking"/"Clients, Products & Business Practices/Improper
Business or Market Practice" cell, disaggregating the data set from 푞 = 0 to 푞 ∕= 0, the value of
휉 increases from 휉 = 0.02657934 to 휉 = 3.013321. In our opinion, the explanation of this fact
stands in the aggregation of many different risk natures - the definition behind this sub-event
covers many kinds of incidents - in a single cell. The fact that for 푞 = 0, the estimation for 휉 was
lower than 1 is explained by the fact that this information set was overwhelm by the other data.
Otherwise, for the cell "Payment and Settlement"/"Execution, Delivery and Process Manage-
ment", 휉 = 2.08 for 푞 = 0, and 휉 = 0.23 for 푞 ∕= 0 only for the disaggregated cell "Payment
and Settlement"/"Vendors and Suppliers". Note that some cells are empty, because BPCE’s
top risk managers dealt with these risks differently and did not ask quotations to the ORM.
We also note that the shape parameter 휉 is positive in every cell of Tables 1 and 3, thus the
quotations’ distributions follow Fréchet distributions (Figure 2) (Gnedenko (1943)) given in (2.1).
With this approach (the use of expert opinions), we are able to anticipate the losses and the
corresponding capital requirement, and by the way we have confirmed the influence of the Basel
matrix construction. To convince risk managers of the interest of this last methodology which
is not based on a collected incidents investigated with the classical loss distribution approach
(LDA) (Lundberg (1903), Frachot et al. (2001) and Guégan and Hassani (2009)), we have com-
8
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pared the capital amounts obtained using the experts opinions with the ones obtained from the
collected losses. These results are provided in Table 5. We observe that even focusing on extreme
losses, this methodology does not always provides a superior capital than the LDA. Therefore,
we think risk managers should be aware that using the EVT does not always mean that we have
extreme capital charges.
On the other hand, comparing both approaches (Experts Vs LDA), even if the amounts may
vary, the ranking of these ones with respect to the class of incidents is globally maintained.
Regarding the volatility between the results obtained from the two methods (Tables 5), we can
mention that the experts tend to provide quotations embedding the entire information available
at the moment they are filling the forms, whereas using historical information sets, due to the
impact of the data processing we observe a long delay between the moment an incident have been
detected and the moment it has been entered in the collecting device. Another reason explaining
the differences between the two procedures can also be interpreted by the fact that the experts
anticipate the losses max values with respect to the internal policy of risk management, such as
the efficiency of the operational risk control system, the quality of the communication from the
top management or the lack of hindsight regarding a particular risk. For example a result such
as the one provided on the first line of Table 5, corresponding to the capital charges estimated
on the "Retail Banking" business line for the "Internal Fraud" event type, we obtain 7 203 175
e using experts opinions against 190 193 051 e with the LDA. The difference between these
two amounts may be interpreted as a failure of the operational risk control system to prevent
these frauds7 We definitively highlighted the importance to consider an a priori knowledge of
the experts associated to a posteriori backtesting based on collected incidents.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a new methodology based on experts opinions and extreme
value theory to evaluate operational risks capital charges. This method does not suffer from
numerical methods and provide an analytic capital charge.
7Theoretically, the two approaches (Experts Vs LDA) are different, therefore this way of thinking may be easily
challenged, nevertheless it might lead practitioners to question their system of control.
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Figure 2: The Fréchet distribution.
With this method, we transformed practitioners judgments into computational values and final
capital allocations. We also illustrated the fact that the data are note contaminated. Their
potential unexploitability (휉 > 1) is just caused by the fact that we mix risks natures for ex-
ample "Theft and Fraud" and "System Security" in a same event, here the "External Fraud" one.
Nevertheless, the reliability of the results depends on the risk management quality and particu-
larly on the aptitude for ORM to work together.
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A Fisher-Tippett theorem
We denote 푋 a random variable (r.v.) with a cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) 퐹 .
Let 푋1, ..., 푋푛 be a sequence of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) r.v., and let
푀푛 = 푚푎푥(푋1, ..., 푋푛). Then, the Fisher and Tippett (1928) theorem says:
Theorem A.1. If there exists constants 푐푛 > 0 and 푑푛 ∈ ℛ, then
ℙ∖
(
푀푛 − 푑푛
푐푛
≤ 푥
)
= 퐹푛(푐푛푥+ 푑푛)
푑→ 퐻휉 (A.1)
for some non-degenerate distribution 퐻휉. Then 퐻휉 belongs to the generalized extreme value
distribution given in (2.1).
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